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The President's Private Dictionary: How
Secret Definitions Undermine Domestic and
Transnational Efforts at Executive Branch
Accountability
SUDHA SETTY
ABSTRACT

The 2016EU-U.S. Privacy Shield is anagreement allowing companies
to move customer data between the European Union and the United States
without running afoul of heightened privacy protections in the European
Union. It was developed in response to EU concerns that the privacy rights
of its citizens have been systematically abrogated by the U.S. government
in the name of nationalsecurity, and contains a variety of assurancesthat
the United States will respect andprotect the privacy rights of EU citizens.
How trustworthy are the U.S. assurances under the Privacy Shield?
Both the Bush and Obama administrationssecretly interpreted the terms
of treaties, statutes, and regulationsin a manner that allowed them to take
controversial actions, keep those actions secret, and later invoke national
security to defend the legality of those actions if they became public. In
cases involving torture, bulk data collection, and targeted killing, these
administrationsdid so despite the common and objective understanding
of applicable legal constraints not providing authorization for the very
actions that they claimed were legal.
It remains an open question as to whether the Trump administration
will interpret the Privacy Shield in a similarly misleading manner:one in
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which public assurances suggest compliance with the Privacy Shield's
constraints, but the administration'sprivate interpretationof the Privacy
Shield secretly breaches EU privacy protections. This Article considers
possible ways to constrain the executive branch from relying on secret
interpretationsthat would undermine the Privacy Shield's transnational
attempts at accountability.
INTRODUCTION

"Trust is a must, it is what will drive our digitalfuture.'
National security related surveillance is always a tricky business. On
the one hand, much of its operational details are solely in the hands of
the executive branch and are kept out of the public eye to improve its
effectiveness. On the other hand, when the public does not understand
the scope of or limitations to surveillance, and the laws meant to
constrain such surveillance seem ineffective, secrecy opens the door for
any number of constitutional, civil, and human rights to be violated. The
government can undercut privacy and dignity rights and chill freedom of
expression, religion, association, and thought. As a result, trust in
government and its institutions erodes.
The European Union guarantees greater privacy and dignity rights
than have been found under the U.S. Constitution, bringing the two
jurisdictions into a potential conflict when a transnational privacy issue
occurs. One context in which these competing, transnational privacy
interests are often in tension involves the transfer of data for business
purposes. Many large companies utilize data transfers on a daily basis
and in large volume. They depend on agreements between the United
States and the European Union to facilitate these data transfers in a
manner that comports with the legal framework of both jurisdictions,
thus limiting the potential for a legal challenge.
From July 2000 to October 2015, companies relied on an agreement
between the U.S. Department of Commerce and the European
Commission for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality called the Safe
Harbor Privacy PrincipleS 2 (Safe Harbor) to enable these transnational
data transfers. In the words of one of the U.S. regulators involved in 2000,
the Safe Harbor "bridges the differences between EU and U.S.
1. Press Release, European Comm'n, Restoring Trust in Transatlantic Data Flows
Through Strong Safeguards: European Commission Presents EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (Feb.
29, 2016) (quoting European Commission Vice-President and European Commissioner for
the Digital Single Market Andrus Ansip on the agreement over the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES (2000) [hereinafter
SAFE HARBOR].
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approaches to privacy protection and will ensure that data flows between
the U.S. and the EU are not interrupted. As a result, it should help ensure
that e-commerce continues to flourish."3 The Safe Harbor promoted
transnational commerce and withstood legal challenge based on the
different standards of privacy in the United States and European Union
for over a decade. 4
In June 2013, the global community became more aware of the
breadth and depth of U.S. surveillance of internet and telephone activity
in the name of national security. Former National Security Agency (NSA)
contractor Edward Snowden disclosed a trove of information regarding
U.S. domestic and global surveillance conducted by the U.S. government
in conjunction with other governments. Those disclosures allowed the
public to understand that personal internet data, if transferred to the
United States, was likely accessible to the U.S. government under a
variety of national security justifications and legal authorizations.
Because the United States specifically carved out national security from
its obligations under the Safe Harbor, it had not prevented any U.S.
agency involved in national security matters from accessing and utilizing
the personal data of European citizens. 5
These developments prompted Austrian law student and Facebook
user Maximilian Schrems to bring suit before Ireland's data protection
commissioner. Schrems alleged that the data in his Facebook account
that was transferred to and from the United States as part of Facebook's
business operations was, unbeknownst to him, accessible by the NSA and
other U.S. government agencies, which constituted a violation of his
rights as an EU citizen. As discussed in Part I, the European Court of
Justice (CJEU) agreed and invalidated the Safe Harbor agreement
between the European Union and the United States. It held that the
purpose of the Safe Harbor was to enable private companies to move
customer-related data between the European Union and the United
States without running afoul of heightened protections for personal
privacy in the European Union, and that the Snowden disclosures made
clear that the central purpose of the Safe Harbor was not being fulfilled.
The CJEU decision led to a fast-paced set of negotiations by U.S. and
EU regulators that culminated in the creation of a new agreement, known
as the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles (Privacy Shield), in

3. Letter from Robert S. LaRussa, Acting Under Sec'y, Int'l Trade Admin. (July 21,
2000), https://build.export.gov/main/safeharbor/euleg-main_018494.
4. See generally Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7 (outlining safe
harbor privacy principles between the EU and U.S. Department of Commerce).
5. See SAFE HARBOR, supra note 2 ("Adherence to these Principles may be limited ...
to the extent necessary to meet national security, public interest, or law enforcement
requirements.").
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February 2016.6 The new Privacy Shield looked to heighten protections

for the data privacy of European citizens and brought into focus the
extent of the difference between the United States and European Union
safeguards of individual rights. In particular, it focused on the extent to
which consumers have the right to protect their data from being sold to
third parties and from national security surveillance and data mining by
the U.S. government. The Privacy Shield included a number of
safeguards to assure EU regulators that U.S. intelligence agencies would
respect the data privacy guarantees of EU citizens, including written
guarantees by U.S. government officials as to their adherence to the
delineated privacy protections, annual privacy reviews conducted by the
U.S. government and EU regulators, and the appointment of a data
privacy ombudsperson with the U.S. State Department to field any
complaints from EU residents alleging privacy violations by a corporation
or by the U.S. government.7 Despite some criticism that the Privacy
Shield did not sufficiently address the concerns of the CJEU in Schrems, 8
it was finalized in July 2016.9
This Article considers the theoretically robust protections for privacy
embedded in the Privacy Shield and potential problems in the way the

6. See Mark Scott, E. U. and U.S. Release Detailson Trans-AtlanticData TransferDeal,
N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/technology/eu-us-transatlantic-data-transfer-deal.html.
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, E.U.-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK PRINCIPLES

(2016) [hereinafter PRIVACY SHIELD]; Mark Scott, European Privacy Regulators Want
Details on 'Safe Harbor'DataDeal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016), httpsJ/www.nytimes.com/2016/
0204/technologyleuropean-privacy-regulators-want-more-details-on-us-safe-harbor-data-deathtml
(detailing some of the concerns surrounding the enforcement of the potential privacy
protections discussed in the negotiations for the Privacy Shield).
8. See Catherine Stupp, Privacy Shield Agreement Signed off Despite Vote Abstentions,
EURACTIV (July 8, 2016), http1/www.euractiv.com/section/digital/newsprivacy-shield-agreementsigned-off-despite-vote-abstentions/.
9. See Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1 (EU); Mark
Scott, EuropeApproves New Trans-AtlanticData TransferDeal, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016),
https//www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/technology/eunashvirope-eu-us-privacy-shield~htmL
Regulators heralded the approval of the Privacy Shield based both on the privacy
protections and the enabling of transnational business:
With the approval of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, we send an important
message to the world: The sharing of ideas and information across
borders is not only good for our businesses but also for our communities
and our people. For businesses, the free flow of data makes it possible
for a startup in Silicon Valley to hire programmers in the Czech
Republic .... For consumers, the free flow of data means that you can
take advantage of the latest, most innovative digital products and
services, no matter where they originate.
Penny Pritzker, U.S. Sec'y of Commerce, Remarks at the E.U.-U.S. Privacy Shield
Framework Press Conference (July 12, 2016), https://www.commerce.gov/news/secretaryspeeches/2016/07/remarks-us-secretary-commerce-penny-pritzker-eu-us-privacy-shield.
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United States might privately interpret its obligations under the Privacy
Shield. Considering those pitfalls, this Article offers a suggestion for
reforming the Privacy Shield to increase the likelihood that it will be
interpreted and implemented by the United States in ways that
adequately address the concerns of the CJEU and properly protect
fundamental privacy rights for EU citizens.
Part I of this Article reviews the development and extent of privacy
rights protected by EU-level institutions and discusses why the CJEU
held that the Safe Harbor was unable to adequately protect those rights.
Part II considers some problematic examples of misleading interpretive
methodology and constructive secrecy1 0 when it comes to national
security matters: situations in which the U.S. government claimed
adherence to a certain set of publicly available principles, but its
private-and often secret-interpretation of the obligations set forth in
the public document were actually quite different from what the public
believed the obligations to entail. If the U.S. government's private
interpretation of the Privacy Shield is significantly different than the
commonly understood meanings of the terms of the deal, this would be a
matter for serious concern in terms of the substantive enforcement of the
negotiated agreement and for the rule of law. Given the risk of
interpretive dissonance and constructive secrecy with regard to the
Privacy Shield, Part III offers a simple suggestion for reform.
I. THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY RIGHTS

The EU framework for individual privacy rights relies on overlapping
legislative and constitutional bases." The interpretation of the
framework, largely the work of the CJEU, limits government, law
enforcement and intelligence agencies, and private companies in terms of
their access to the personal information of EU residents. In doing so, the
CJEU is at the forefront of institutions attempting to carve out a space
for individuals to retain control over what information is made public and
made available to governments, law enforcement, and the intelligence
community. 12 It remains to be seen in the coming years whether the

10. Constructive secrecy is discussed in detail in Part II, infra.
11. Federico Fabbrini, The EU Charter of FundamentalRights and the Rights to Data
Privacy: The EU Court of Justice as a Human Rights Court, in THE EU CHARTER OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS A BINDING INSTRUMENT 261 (Sybe de Vries et al. eds., 2015).
12. See Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen, Case C-203/15, 2016 E.C.R. 1 112
("Telef'). This December 2016 CJEU decision invalidated sections of the United Kingdom's
Data Protection and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 that required bulk collection of
telecommunications metadata and invalidated data retention orders issued by the Swedish
Post and Telecom Authority, on the basis that EU privacy law precludes domestic legislation
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CJEU and other EU institutions continue to push forward in protecting
privacy rights or the CJEU eventually succumbs to substantial
governmental and private sector pressure to allow for more data
collection as part of a neoliberal model of governance. As evidenced by the
Schrems decision in 2015, the CJEU has thus far robustly protected
privacy rights.
The CJEU decision in Schrems drew on a relatively strong backdrop
of EU protections for informational privacy that had been in place for
decades. In 1995, the adoption of a Data Protection Directive included the
affirmative obligation of EU Member States to "protect the fundamental
rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to
privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data."1 3 Further,
Member States are responsible for ensuring that data collection is not
excessive and is conducted only when the target has given consent. 14 The
standard for compliance under the Data Protection Directive turns on
either affirmative consent or the data collection being "necessary:"' 5
Member States shall provide that personal data may be
processed only if: (a) the data subject has unambiguously
given his consent; or (b) processing is necessary for the
performance of a contract to which the data subject is
party or in order to take steps at the request of the data
subject prior to entering into a contract; or (c) processing
is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to
which the controller is subject; or (d) processing is
necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data
subject; or (e) processing is necessary for the performance
of a task carried out in the public interest or in the
exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in
a third party to whom the data are disclosed; or (f)
processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate
interests pursued by the controller or by the third party
or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where
such interests are overridden by the interests for

that provides for "general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data of all
subscribers and registered users." Press Release No. 145/16, E.C.J. (Dec. 21, 2016).
13. Directive 95/46/EC, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38. This Directive will be replaced
by the more comprehensive General Data Protection Regulation that will go into effect in
May 2018. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
14. Directive 95/46/EC, art. 1.
15. Id. art. 7.
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fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject
which require protection under Article 1(1).16
In terms of the first way in which the Data Protection Directive has
historically been satisfied, European Union users of Facebook and many
other services have given their consent to transfer data through the use
of Standard Contractual Clauses17 that the European Commission
preapproved as satisfying data protection requirements. In consenting to
user agreements that contain these Standard Contractual Clauses,
European citizens may have wittingly or unwittingly contributed to the
undercutting of their own guaranteed fundamental right to privacy. 1
Litigation on the question of consent and the use of Standard Contractual
Clauses is ongoing. As such, it is still unclear how the European courts
view arguments regarding whether consent is made unknowingly-or
without meaningful choice and, therefore, whether privacy rights are
implicated when consumers consent to the sharing of their data. 19
Regarding the second prong, the Data Protection Directive is directed
at governments and private entities alike. As evidenced in Schrems, the
European Union has been skeptical of the stated corporate need for
seamless information transfer about individuals across international

16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. See Model Contracts for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, EUR.
COMM'N (Nov. 24, 2016); Christopher Kuner, Improper Implementation of EU Data
ProtectionLaw Regarding Use of the Standard Contractual Clauses in Germany, (Oct. 6,
2006), available at https-/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstractid-1444813 (critiquing the
Standard Contractual Clauses for undercutting individual privacy rights).
18. See Francesca Bignami, TransatlanticPrivacyRegulation: Conflict and Cooperation,
78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 239-40 (2015); European Ruling Is Merely a Symbolic
Victory for Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/09/o
pinionleurpean-ruling-is-merely-a-symbolic-victory-for-privacy.html
19. Soon after the 2015 CJEU ruling in Schrems, Schrems himself challenged the
standard form contractual language used by Facebook before the Irish Data Protection
Commissioner. See Update on Litigation Involving Facebook and Maximilian Schrems:
Explanatory Memo, OFFICE OF THE DATA PROT. COMM'R, https//www.dataprotection.ieldocs/2
8-9-2016-Explanatory-memo-on-litigation-involving-Facebook-and-Maximilin-Schrems/1598.htm
(Mar. 16, 2017). The Data Protection Commissioner issued a Draft Decision in May 2016
that Facebook's contractual language did not adequately address the concerns over data
privacy. See id. The question of whether the matter should be referred to the CJEU for
consideration was heard by the Irish High Court in February 2017. See id. As of April 2017,
the Irish Data Protection Commissioner had not yet made a decision as to whether to refer
Schrems's case to the CJEU. See id. A similar concern over data privacy was apparent in
Tele2, in which the CJEU opined that, in order for European telecommunications providers
to comport with their EU privacy obligations, "national legislation must make provision for
the data to be retained within the European Union and for the irreversible destruction of
the data at the end of the data retention period." Tele2, supra note 12, 1 122.
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borders. 20 Regular and voluminous transfers of user data are essential to
Facebook's ability to process, store, and monetize user data. Schrems
contested the transfer of the data in his Facebook profile from Ireland,
where Facebook's European operations are headquartered, to the United
States. Ireland's Data Protection Commissioner denied Schrems's initial
complaint on the grounds that a 2000 European Commission Decision
found that the Safe Harbor provides sufficient protection for consumer
data. 21
The Irish High Court heard Schrems' appeal and sought guidance
from the CJEU as to whether a domestic data protection authority had
the right, despite the 2000 European Commission decision, to conduct an
independent investigation as to whether the 1995 Data Protection
Directive was being enforced in ways that provided adequate protection
to EU customers. As an initial matter, the CJEU found that domestic
data protection commissions in the European Union had such authority.
The CJEU also took on the central issue that Schrems raised:
whether the Safe Harbor was an insufficient control on U.S. data sharing
practices, particularly in light of the 2013 Snowden disclosures. Schrems
pointed to two conflicting principles. The first was the guarantee of
privacy protection as a fundamental human right under the Data
Protection Directive and Article 7 of the Charter of the European Union.
Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive makes the obligations of EU
nations clear:

.

1. The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a
third country of personal data .. . may take place only if
. . the third country in question ensures an adequate level
of protection.
2. The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a
third country shall be assessed in the light of all the
circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or
set of data transfer operations; particular consideration
shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and
duration of the proposed processing operation or
operations, the country of origin and country of final
destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in
force in the third country in question and the professional

20. See Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm'r, 2015 E.C.R. 650, ¶ 34
(noting that legislation allowing general access to electronic data transfers undercuts the
fundamental right to private life).
21. See id. 111 5-10 (discussing Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, supra note 4).
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rules and security measures which are complied with in
that country. 22
This protective language conflicts, however, with the second
principle embodied in the language of the Safe Harbor, which qualifies
the obligations of U.S. companies in numerous ways:
Adherence to these Principles may be limited: (a) to the
extent necessary to meet national security, public
interest, or law enforcement requirements; (b) by statute,
government regulation, or case-law that create conflicting
obligations or explicit authorisations, provided that, in
exercising any such authorisation, an organisation can
demonstrate that its non-compliance with the Principles
is limited to the extent necessary to meet the overriding
legitimate interests furthered by such authorisation. 23
The CJEU evaluated the privacy protection against the national
security carve-out, along with information about the actual domestic
24
practices of the United States that could protect or undercut privacy.
Looking at the actual practices of the United States in terms of bulk data
and metadata collection and storage and the lack of effective oversight of
these practices, the CJEU concluded that the Safe Harbor did not
adequately protect the fundamental right to privacy as guaranteed under
the EU Charter and the Data Protection Directive. 25 Ultimately, it held
that the entire agreement was invalid. 26
The Schrems decision had immediate effects for regulators in several
countries: numerous domestic privacy regulators within the EU began
taking a closer look at whether their citizens' data was being misused by
U.S. companies in ways that violated EU privacy rights. As a result, a
number of U.S. companies were ordered to modify their practices for data
collection and use. 27 Also, U.S. and EU negotiators began talks to draw

.

22. Directive 95/46/EC, supranote 13, art. 25.
23. Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. 650, 1 8 (citing U.S. Department of Commerce communications
regarding its safe harbor obligations).
24. Id. 1 75.
25. See id. ¶1 90-96 ("In particular, legislation permitting the public authorities to have
access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded
as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life, as
guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter . .
26. Id. 1 106.
27. See, e.g., Facebook Hit by French Privacy Order, BBC (Feb. 9, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35531224 (discussing the order of the French data
protection authority, the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertes, to
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up a replacement for the Safe Harbor that would provide privacy
protections satisfactory to the CJEU while also letting companies conduct
the transnational data transfers and processing that is integral to their
business models and worth billions of dollars annually. 28
In February 2016, negotiators came to agreement over the EU-U.S.
Privacy Shield, enabling heightened oversight of U.S. governmental data
collection. 29 Various safeguards were proposed to assure EU regulators
that U.S. intelligence agencies would respect the data privacy guarantees
for EU citizens. Those safeguards focused on three particular areas. First,
U.S. government officials provided written guarantees as to the manner
in which European privacy rights were being respected and data
collection would be limited. 30 Second, the U.S. government promised to
undertake annual data privacy reviews in conjunction with their EU
counterparts. 31 Third, the U.S. State Department promised to appoint a
data privacy ombudsperson to field complaints from EU residents
regarding the violation of privacy rights by a corporation or by the U.S.
government. 32
Both U.S. and EU negotiators stated that protecting the privacy
rights of EU residents was paramount, and the United States attempted
to demonstrate its public commitment to the parameters of the Privacy
Shield by publishing detailed letters by administrative agencies to that
effect. 33 Despite those reassurances and even though the new framework

was approved in July 2016, deep skepticism remains as to whether the
U.S. intelligence agencies will abide by the terms of the new Privacy

Facebook to prevent unfettered online access to data about French Facebook users, and to
stop transferring all of its French user data to the United States).
28. See Kelly Couturier, How EuropeIs GoingAfter Google, Amazon and Other U.S. Tech
Giants, N.Y. TIMES (updated Dec. 20, 2016), httpsJ/www.nytimes.com/nteractive/2015/04

/13/technology/how-europe-is-going-after-us-tech-giants.html

(noting the business value of the

data transfers as part of the backdrop that pressured negotiators to move quickly on
replacing the invalidated safe harbor provisions after Schrems).
29. See Press Release, European Comm'n, supra note 1.
30. See generally Letter from Penny Pritzker, U.S. Sec'y of Commerce, to Vra JourovA,
Comm'r for Justice, Consumers, & Gender Equal., European Comm'n (Feb. 23,2016) (noting
the inclusion, with the Privacy Shield, of letters from the Federal Trade Commission,
Department of Transportation, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, each
detailing the ways in which each agency would comply with the parameters of the Privacy
Shield).
31. See, e.g., PRIVACY SHIELD, supra note 7, Annex I: Arbitral Model.
32. See id. Annex A- EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Ombudsperson Mechanism.
33. See, e.g., Letter from Robert S. Litt, Office of the Gen. Counsel of the Office of the
Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, to Justin S. Antonipillai & Ted Dean (Feb. 22, 2016) (sending a
detailed letter to the U.S. Department of Commerce and the International Trade
Administration describing the information that the ODNI shared with European Union
regulators in the process of negotiating the Privacy Shield).
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Shield, 34 particularly in light of the post-September 11 practice of the U.S.
government to use national security as a pretext for reinterpreting its
obligations under international law and transnational agreements.
II. POTENTIAL PITFALLS IN INTERPRETING THE PRIVACY SHIELD
35
Numerous important concerns hang over the new Privacy Shield,
and this Part focuses on one of the interpretive questions: how will the
United States construe the limitations in the Privacy Shield as an
operational matter? Will it comport with the generally understood
meaning of the terms of the agreement, or will it use a type of
"constructive secrecy" to undermine the CJEU's decision in Schrems?
Constructive secrecy can be best understood as occurring when the
government makes a commitment on terms that are commonly
understood, but the government has a second interpretation of that
commitment-kept secret from the public-that is quite different than
the public understanding. Under such circumstances, the government
may claim that it has abided by its public commitment and that it is not
developing secret law and policy that undermines the public commitment;
in fact, the meaning on which the government is relying may be
technically available through piecing together a variety of sources and
36
making inferential leaps as to what the government is actually doing.
But if the government allows the dissonance between the publicly
understood meaning and the private, legally operative meaning to stand,
then oversight becomes less effective, transnational counterparties
cannot properly hold the executive branch to account, and the rule of law
37
is undermined-all in secret.
Although it seems Orwellian to foster or at least allow for a
disjunctive understanding of a legally operative term in order to further
utilitarian national security ends, the last fifteen years suggest that this

34. See Mark Scott, U.S. and Europe in 'Safe Harbor'Data Deal, but Legal Fight May
Await, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/technology/useurope-safe-harbor-data-deal.html.
35. See Peter Margulies, Privacy Shield's Prospects:The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
IAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2016, 8:50 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/privacy-shields-prospectsgood-bad-and-ugly.
36. See generally Sudha Setty, NATIONAL SECURITY SECRECY: COMPARATIVE EFFECTS ON
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW (forthcoming Cambridge Univ. Press 2017) (introducing
the concept of constructive secrecy and its implications for oversight in national security
contexts).
37. See Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1566,
1568-69 (2016) ("By publicly promoting a known standard but concealing its actual
interpretation, the national security executive hinders meaningful evaluation of the extent
to which its actions comport with individual rights, democratic values, and the law itself.").
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kind of constructive secrecy is not uncommon. Its use in both the Bush
and Obama administrations should prompt further inquiry into the
trustworthiness of recent U.S. government reassurances regarding the
Privacy Shield. In the post-September 11 context, both the Bush and
Obama administrations interpreted treaties, statutes, and regulations in
a manner that allowed the executive branch to take desired but
controversial actions, keep those actions secret for some time, and later
claim their actions were legally authorized when those actions became
public. These administrations did so despite the common and objective
understanding of applicable legal constraints seeming not to authorize
the actions that the administrations claimed were authorized. The
sometimes inconsistent decisions made by the Trump administration
thus far with regard to national security, privacy rights, and the
obligation to follow existing law also suggest that the European Union
should be wary as to how the Trump administration will interpret its
obligations under the Privacy Shield."
Three examples from the last fifteen years-the legal justification for
torture, the use of weaponized drones to kill individuals outside of a
theater of war, and the mass data collection and surveillance of U.S.
citizens within the United States-illustrate how corrosive secrecy can
be and serve as a reminder as to why measures should be taken to
minimize the risk of misleading interpretative approaches that may
undermine the letter and aspirations of the Privacy Shield under the
Trump administration and beyond.
A. Torture
The Bush administration legitimized torture as an interrogation and
control technique for detainees through the development of a body of
secret law that authorized torture despite international and domestic
prohibitions. 39 As part of that effort, administration lawyers gave legal
comfort to those engaging in or promoting the use of torture. Both the
acts of torture and the legal justification for it were deliberately kept
secret so as to avoid accountability and a public airing of the
administration's policy. 40 The justification for torture was based
38. See, e.g., Evan Perez, Pamela Brown & Kevin Liptak, Inside the Confusion of the
Trump Executive Order and Travel Ban, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017) (describing the confusion
among federal government officials and the public as to the scope and applicability of
President Trump's Jan. 27, 2017 executive order regarding immigration).
39. Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal
Policy Doesn't Let the Terrorists Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579, 591 (2009).
40. Id. at 593-94.
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primarily on two August 2002 memoranda from the Office of Legal
Counsel in the Department of Justice (OLC)-held secret until leaked
years later-that analyzed the definition of "torture" as applied to
interrogation techniques used on persons captured in the so-called "war
on terror" and held outside of the United States. 41
The first memorandum 42 was drafted by then-OLC attorney John
43
and signed by then-Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee.
YOO
Although the Bush administration relied on this memorandum from 2002
to 2004 to delineate those interrogation techniques that were-under its
interpretation-lawful, 44 the memorandum itself was only made public
through a mid-2004 leak, after the public learned of detainee abuses at
46
the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. 45 Congressional and public outrage at
the authorization of harsh interrogation techniques, like waterboarding,
which had long been considered a form of torture under international law,
and the narrowing of the conventional definition of torture 47 to provide
41. Id. at 589 (describing the rule of law problems associated with secret lawmaking by
the Office of Legal Counsel).
42. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Office
of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002)
[hereinafter Bybee Memorandum]. The Bybee Memorandum was superseded, in part, by
another memorandum drafted by the acting head of the OLC, Daniel Levin, that addressed
the applicability of the Convention Against Torture and disavowed some of the conclusions
made in the Bybee Memorandum. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant
Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to James B. Comey, Deputy Att'y
Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin Memorandum].
43. John Yoo, Behind the 'Torture Memos", SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 2, 2005),
http://www.aei.org/publication/behind-the-torture-memos/.
44. The Defense Department incorporated significant portions of the language from the
Bybee Memorandum in its own report on interrogation practices. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF.,
WORKING

GROUP REPORT

ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS

IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON

TERRORISM 61-69 (2003) (enumerating thirty-five techniques and evaluating the usefulness
of those techniques); Douglas Jehl et al., C.I.A. Is Seen as Seeking New Role on Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/16/politics/cia-is-seen-asseeking-new-role-on-detainees.html (explaining that the Bybee Memorandum was "sought
by the C.I.A. to protect its employees from liability").
45. See Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justificationfor Use of Torture;
Justice Dept. Gave Advice in 2002, WASH. POST (June 8, 2004), http1/www.washingtonpostco
m/wp-dyn/articles/A23373-2004Jun7.html ("[T]he Justice Department advised the White House
that torturing al Qaeda terrorists in captivity abroad 'may be justified,' and that
international laws against torture 'may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations'
conducted in President Bush's war on terrorism . . . .").
46. See Adam Liptak, Legal Scholars Criticize Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2004, at A14 ("[A] law professor at the University of Chicago, said: 'It's egregiously bad. It's
very low level, it's very weak, embarrassingly weak, just short of reckless."').
47. See Bybee Memorandum, supra note 42, at 46 ("[W]e conclude that torture as defined
in and proscribed by [the Convention Against Torture], covers only extreme acts ....
Because the acts inflicting torture are extreme, there is [a] significant range of acts that
though they might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment fail to
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legal comfort to interrogators who engaged in harsh techniques,48 forced
President Bush to disavow the use of torture during interrogations. 49
The second August 2002 memorandum, issued on the same day as the
first and also authorized by Bybee,5 o reinforced the administration's view
that the definition of torture was extremely narrow and required specific
intent by interrogators to cause serious physical or mental harm.
Additionally, the second memorandum's specific intent requirement
protected interrogators.5 1 A heavily redacted version of this
memorandum was released by the Bush administration on July 24, 2008,
in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. 52 Only the
late 2004 OLC memorandum declaring that "[tiorture is abhorrent both
to American law and values and to international norms" was voluntarily
made public by the administration. However, even this memorandum
contained legal protection for CIA interrogators to insulate them from
future prosecution. 53
A March 2003 OLC memorandum 54 provided additional legal comfort
to interrogators by asserting that "federal laws prohibiting assault,
maiming and other [violent] crimes did not apply to military
interrogators" who questioned captives in the war on terror.55 This
rise to the level of torture."). The Bybee Memorandum also stated that the proscriptions of
the Convention Against Torture likely did not apply to the President's execution of the war
on terror, under the rationale that the Convention infringed upon the President's executive
authority as Commander-in-Chief Id. at 36-39 ("[T]he structure of the Constitution
demonstrates that any power traditionally understood as pertaining to the executivewhich includes the conduct of warfare and the defense of the nation-unless expressly
assigned in the Constitution to Congress, is vested in the President.").
48. Additionally, Bybee offered two broad defenses to individuals who used techniques
which would fall within the narrowed definition of torture: necessity and self-defense. See
id. at 39-46.
49. See Eric Mink, Editorial, The Torture Memos Lies, Deceit - and Maybe War Crimes,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 2008, at D11. See generally Levin Memorandum, supra
note 42 (replacing parts of the Bybee Memorandum that addressed the applicability of the
Convention Against Torture and disavowed some of the conclusions from the Bybee
Memorandum).
50. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y General, U.S. Dep't of Justice Office
of Legal Counsel, to John Rizzo, Gen. Counsel of the Cent. Intelligence Agency, U.S. Dep't
of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Second Bybee Memorandum].
51. See id. at 16-17.
52. Documents Released by the CIA and Justice Department in Response to the ACLU's
Torture FOIA, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/36104res20080724.html (last
visited Mar. 5, 2017).
53. Levin Memorandum, supra note 42, at 1.
54. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of the
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def., U.S.
Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel 8 n.10 (Mar. 14, 2003).
55. Dan Eggen & Josh White, Memo: Laws Didn't Apply to Interrogators,WASH. POST,
Apr. 2, 2008, at Al.
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memorandum sought to insulate U.S. government agents from
prosecution or other legal liability if they used highly coercive
interrogation techniques, such as waterboarding, head slapping, and
exposure of prisoners to extreme temperatures.5 The memorandum was
initially classified by the Department of Justice to prevent disclosure but
was declassified in 2008 after a review undertaken as part of a FOIA
lawsuit.5 7 The initial classification was made because of purported

national security concerns requiring secrecy.58 This memorandum
contained neither sensitive personal information nor details about
specific intelligence-gathering programs, but its contents were also kept
secret from the top lawyers for each branch of the military.59
Public knowledge of the abuses at the Abu Ghraib detention center in
Iraq did not prevent the OLC from continuing to generate its body of
secret law justifying torture. A nonpublic 2005 opinion authorized torture
techniques, such as waterboarding, and the use of such techniques in
combination with each other, for the interrogation of persons designated
as enemy combatants.6 0 A late 2005 opinion was drafted after Congress
passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which specifically outlawed
some harsh interrogation techniques. 61 This opinion confirmed that CIA
practices were reconcilable with the Detainee Treatment Act's
restrictions, once again providing legal cover for CIA interrogators
against potential future prosecution. 62 Finally, a 2006 executive order,
which was reviewed and approved by the OLC, confirmed authorization
for the use of "enhanced" interrogation techniques. 63 Additional

56. See id.
57. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Secret Bush Administration
Torture Memo Released Today in Response to ACLU Lawsuit (Apr. 1, 2008),
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/34747prs200804O1.html.
58. See Eggen & White, supra note 55.
59. See id.
60. See Eggen & White, supra note 55. It was later revealed that certain members of
Congress were briefed on the use of waterboarding of prisoners as early as 2002, but that
they were forbidden from taking written notes on the brief, or from disclosing their
knowledge to anyone, including their own staff members. Joby Warrick & Dan Eggen, Hill
Briefed on Waterboardingin 2002, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2007, at Al. Rep. Jane Harman
noted that she filed a classified letter objecting to the program, but was prevented from
speaking publicly due to the rules of secrecy governing her role on an intelligence committee.
See id.
61. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.
62. Scott Shane et al., Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 2007, at Al.
63. Id.
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memoranda regarding interrogation techniques have been issued but not
made public.64
Much of the substantive criticism of these memos at the time of the
leaks turned on the expansive assertion of executive power 65 and the
resulting erosion of due process and human rights protections for persons
designated as "enemy combatants."66 From a rule of law viewpoint, it was
disturbing that the Bush administration was able to easily and readily
exploit a structural flaw: it interpreted the lack of a requirement to
disclose its legal policy as an affirmation that keeping its body of law
secret was acceptable, insisting that secrecy was necessary to maintain
the integrity of U.S. national security interests, 67 and arguing that
information as to interrogation techniques would empower terrorists
planning to attack the United States.6 8 The Bush administration then
used that secrecy to draft a series of memos providing legal comfort for
arguably illegal actions under international and domestic law, all while
claiming that it was abiding by its legal commitments. The private
dictionary of the Bush administration when it came to the meaning of
"torture" would not have become known but for leaks, press reporting,
and FOIA litigation regarding the grotesque treatment of detainees. In
the end, however, torture and the secret legal contortions undertaken by

64. Id.
65. Thomas Poguntke & Paul Webb, The Presidentializationof Politics in Democratic
Societies: A Framework for Analysis, in THE PRESIDENTIALIZATION OF POLITICS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MODERN DEMOCRACIES 1 (Thomas Poguntke & Paul Webb eds.,
2005).
66. See Eggen & White, supra note 55; Editorial, There Were Orders to Follow, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/opinion/04fril.html. (noting that
the Yoo Memorandum was "81 pages of twisted legal reasoning to justify President Bush's
decision to ignore federal law and international treaties and authorize the abuse and torture
of prisoners").
67. See Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance
Authority: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 264-320 (2007)
[hereinafter Wartime Executive Power] (statement of Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General
of the United States); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal
Constraintson Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1565 (2007).
68. See Wartime Executive Power, supra note 67, at 107 (suggesting such revelations
remind the enemy that they are being monitored); Carol D. Leonnig & Eric Rich, U.S. Seeks
Silence on CIA Prisons;Court Is Asked to Bar Detaineesfrom Talking About Interrogations,
WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2006, at Al. The Obama administration echoed this type of language
when it attempted to justify the type of data gathering and surveillance that was exposed
by Snowden, and which gave rise to the CJEU's invalidation of the Safe Harbor agreement
in Schrems. See Jeremy Herb, Intel Panel: DOD Report Finds Snowden Leaks Helped
Terrorists, THE HILL (Jan. 9, 2014), http://thehill.com/policy/defense/194937-intel-paneldod-report-flinds-snowden-leaks-helped.
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the Bush administration to justify it undermined both international and
domestic trust in the Bush administration for its remaining years.
B. Targeted Killings

'

When he took office in 2009, President Obama promised a return to
the rule of law that would uphold national security interests, civil
liberties, and the democratic value of governmental transparency. In
some matters, he fulfilled his promise of cutting back on national security
secrecy, such as reversing the Bush administration's FOIA policy to make
access to some types of government information easier.69 However, there
were numerous areas where those aspirations were not met. In the
7
context of the use of drones for targeted killings 70 of militants,
administration officials repeatedly emphasized the necessity, efficacy,
and legality of targeted killings as a counterterrorism tool.72
Administration officials resisted the idea that other branches of
government and the public have the right to know the parameters of the
drone strike program. The program prompted much debate over the
threshold question of whether a systemic targeted killing program ought
74
to exist, 73 the moral calculus of remote-control extrajudicial killings, the
75
and the specific questions
legal authorities for such a program,
69. See Presidential Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
Concerning the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009).
70. Although targeted killing is not defined under international law, it is often
considered to encompass "premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in times of
peace or during armed conflict to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody."
Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 23, 2013),
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. Although the governments
that utilize targeted killings differentiate them from assassinations, critics view them as
similar actions in terms of illegality. CompareHarold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't
of State, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The
Obama Administration and International Law (March 25, 2010) with Complaint at 5, AlAulaqi, et al. v. Panetta, No. 1:12-cv-01192-RMC (D.D.C. July 18, 2012).
71. See Drone Wars Pakistan:Analysis, NEW AM. FOUND., http://securitydata.newam
erica.net/drones/pakistan -analysis. html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (detailing the
number of drone strikes by the United States in Pakistan since 2004).
72. See Koh, supra note 70.
73. See, e.g., Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions), Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add. 6 (May 28, 2010)
(questioning the legality of the CIA drone program).
74. See generally Samuel Isaacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Drones and the Dilemma of
Modern Warfare, in DRONE WARS: TRANSFORMING CONFLICT, LAW, AND POLICY 388 (Peter
Bergen & Daniel Rothenberg, eds.) (theorizing the moral dilemma of drone use in the
context of individuated warfare).
75. See Alston, supra note 73, ¶¶ 28-92 (discussing international law of war principles
with regard to targeted killings); Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Speech at Northwestern

530

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 24:2

regarding the legality of its scope in terms of geographic location and
citizenship of the target. 76 Despite these questions, the parameters of the
targeted killing program remain largely secret, except for leaks and
instances when it was self-serving to the Obama administration to make
such information public.77
Occasional speeches by Obama administration officials from 2011
onward,78 a classified Department of Justice memorandum leaked in
early 2013,79 and the Presidential Policy Guidance memorandum drafted
in May 2013 and made public in August 2016 disclosed limited
information.8 0 The early 2013 leak may have prompted the Presidential
Policy Guidance, and certainly prompted. a May 2013 speech in which
President Obama looked to both defend the legality of the targeted

University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012) (outlining the parameters used by the Obama
administration to determine whether a targeted killing comports with international and
domestic legal obligations); Jeh C. Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., Speech on National
Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration (Feb. 22, 2012)
(echoing previous administration legal justifications for targeted killing); Koh, supra note
70 (arguing that the Obama administration's use of targeted killing as a counterterrorism
tool complied with international and domestic legal obligations).
76. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing, based on
standing grounds, the suit of Nasser al-Aulaqi to enjoin the U.S. government from keeping
his son, U.S. citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi, on its targeted killing list).
77. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and
Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013); Stephanie
Condon, Obama: Anwar al-Awlaki's Death a 'Major Blow" to al Qaeda and Affiliates,
CBSNEWS (Sept. 30, 2011, 4:40 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-anwar-alawlakis-death-a-major-blow-to-al-qaeda-and-affihiates/ (relating comments by President
Obama about the strategic importance of the targeted killing Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.
citizen in Yemen).
78. E.g., John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws,
Address at Harvard Law School (Sept. 16, 2011); Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att'y
Gen., to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (May 22, 2013)
(detailing the administration's legal basis for the use of targeted killings against Anwar alAulaqi and other U.S. citizens overseas); Koh, supra note 70.
79. See U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WHITE PAPER: LAWFULNESS OF
A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL
LEADER OF AL-QA'IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE [hereinafter DOJ WHITE PAPER], available

at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/ilmsnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJWhitePaper.pdf (last
accessed Mar. 5, 2017).
80. Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside
the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities, ACLU (May 22, 2013),
https/www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/felddocument/presidential~policy-guidance.pdf This memo
was disclosed as a result of Freedom of Information Act litigation brought by the American
Civil Liberties Union.
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killings program and the secrecy surrounding it.81 At the same time that
the administration discussed and leaked aspects of the program, it also
relied upon the classified 82 nature of the program to shield itself from
media inquiry 83 and from judicial accountability by using the standing
doctrine and state secrets privilege to secure the dismissal of a suit
challenging the constitutionality of the program. 84
In his May 2013 speech, President Obama focused largely on the
parameters for targeted killings, reiterating known positions of the
administration, claiming that drone strikes were legal under
international law standards 85 because they defended against "imminent"
threats,86 stating that U.S. citizenship is no protection against being
targeted for a drone strike,87 and making clear that he could keep as much

81. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense
University (May 23, 2013), httpJ/ww.whitehouse.gov/the-press-offlce/2013/05/23/remarkspresident-national-defense-university [hereinafter May 2013 NDU Speech].
82. See generally Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret Kill List' Proves a Test of Obama's
Principlesand Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at Al (discussing internal administration
debates as to whether to declassify the legal justifications for the drone program, and noting
that the administration decided not to do so); Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal
Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, at Al (offering details of a still-classified
Office of Legal Counsel memorandum justifying the targeted killings of U.S. citizens).
83. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
3, 2013) (dismissing requests made under the Freedom of Information Act for documents
regarding the targeted killing program, based on the administration's claim of necessary
secrecy surrounding counterterrorism programs); Milena Sterio, The Covert Use ofDrones:
How Secrecy Undermines Oversight and Accountability, 8 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 129, 134-35
(2015) (detailing the selective and utilitarian disclosures surrounding the covert CIA drone
program); Jameel Jaffer, Selective Disclosure About TargetedKilling, JUST SECURITY (Oct.
7, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/1704/selective-disclosure-targeted-kiling/.
84. See generally Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing the
suit brought by the father of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, which sought an injunction
against the targeted killing of his son, based on a lack of standing and administration claims
of necessary secrecy surrounding counterterrorism programs). Anwar al-Awlaki was killed
by a drone strike in September 2011. Charlie Savage, Court Releases Large Parts ofMemo
2014),
N.Y. TIMES (June 23,
Approving Killing of American in Yemen,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/us/justice-department-found-it-lawful-to-targetanwar-al-awlaki.html.
85. Compare May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 81, with Holder, supra note 78, and
Koh, supranote 70 (President Obama articulated proportionality and distinction principles
that largely reflected the standards offered by Attorney General Holder and State
Department Legal Adviser Koh in previous speeches).
86. Compare May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 81, with Holder, supra note 78, and
Koh, supra note 70 (arguing the legality of ordering a targeted killing when, among other
factors, an undefined "imminence" standard was met).
87. Compare May 2013 NDU Speech, supranote 81 (noting that "the high threshold that
we've set for taking lethal action applies to all potential terrorist targets, regardless of
whether or not they are American citizens"), with Holder, supra note 78.
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of the drone program secret as he wished.88 This defense of the drone
program sparked criticism on numerous grounds, including the lack of
clarity over what constituted an "imminent" threat in the view of the
Obama administration.8 9 Despite years of FOIA litigation and other
attempts to understand more fully the parameters of the targeted killing
program, the question remains how the Obama administration's private
dictionary defined "imminence."90
The idea of basing the decision to use force against an enemy on the
question of imminence is not new; in fact, it is quite common in
discussions of law of war principles governing the preemptive or
anticipatory use of force as a matter of self-defense.9 1 The real question
was how the standard of "imminence" was being interpreted by the
Obama administration. Was it a well-understood and traditional
interpretation of the term, such as dealing with an immediate and
concrete threat that created the overwhelming need to use force because
there is no time for deliberation? 92 Was it a definition of "imminence"
grounded in the international human rights principles of necessity and
proportionality, such that lethal force is only justifiable if the attack is
unavoidable but for the use of that lethal force against the threat?93 From
the information made available through leaks and disclosures, it seems
as though neither of these definitions of "imminence" governed the
Obama administration's decision making regarding targeted killings. In
fact, a 2011 Justice Department White Paper specifically noted that an
imminent threat "does not require the United States to have clear
evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take
place in the immediate future." 94
The human toll of drone strikes, the U.S definition of the theater of
war as encompassing the entire world,9 5 the 2013 government prediction
that the U.S. efforts against al-Qaeda would last another ten to twenty
88. See May 2013 NDU Speech, supranote 81.
89. E.g., Fred Kaplan, Obama's Post-9/11 World, SLATE (May 23, 2013, 6:25 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/warstories/2013/05/barack-obama_natio
naldefenseuniversity speech nothing-newabout drones.html
(noting
that
the
administration's definition of an imminent threat meant that "'imminent' doesn't really
mean 'imminent"').
90. See Anna Diakun, Fighting to Bring the DroneProgram into the Light, ACLU (Oct.
25, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/fighting-bring-drone-program-light.
91. See Rosa Brooks, Drones and the InternationalRule of Law, 28 J. ETHICS & INT'L
AFF. 83, 93 (2014).
92. Id.
93. See Sinnar, supra note 37, at 1601.
94. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 79, at 7.
95. Spencer Ackerman, Pentagon Spec Ops Chief Sees '10 to 20' More Years of War
Against Al-Qaida, WIRED (May 16, 2013, 11:49 AM), http1/www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/0
5/decades-of-war/.
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years,96 and the administration's defense of the legality of the program,
should beget calls for more accountability measures. Congress and/or the
judiciary should assert themselves to protect against and provide redress
for arbitrary or abusive decision making in the process of extrajudicial
killings. Yet Congress has expressed little will to set meaningful
parameters on the program, and the judiciary has shied away from
adjudicating the legality of placing targets for extrajudicial killings on a
government list, even if those targets are U.S. citizens who are not
"imminently" attacking the United States in any conventional sense of
the word.97 Actual protection of rights would necessitate more than
rhetoric about the efficacy and legality of the drone program that cannot
actually be examined and verified because of national security secrecy.
As in the case of torture, the legally operative understandings used by
the Obama administration were unknown and may very well have been
in violation of public commitments to international and domestic law.
C. The NSA's MetadataProgram
Legal constraints on intelligence gathering were loosened
significantly in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The Bush and
Obama administrations interpreted the USA Patriot Act as authorizing
98
the collection and storage of domestic telephony and internet metadata
and the collection and content searches of substantial amounts of foreign
This gave the intelligence
telephone and internet communications.
96. Id.
97. See generally Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing the
suit brought by the father of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, which sought an injunction
against the targeted killing of his son, based on a lack of standing and administration claims
of necessary secrecy surrounding counterterrorism programs).
98. The telephony metadata authorized for collection is defined as:
[I]nclud[ing] comprehensive communications routing information,
including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g.,
originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile station [sic]
Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone
calling card numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony
metadata does not include the substantive content of any
communication ... or the name, address, or financial information of a
subscriber or customer.
See Primary Order at 3 n. 1, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an
Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted] (FISA Ct. 2013),
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/PrimaryOrderCollection_215.pdf.http://www.dni.gov/f
iles/documents/PrimaryOrder_- Collection_215.pdf.
99. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287
[hereinafter PATRIOT Act] (arguably authorizing the collection and storage of bulk
metadata); FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438

534

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 24:2

community a much larger haystack of information from which to attempt
to glean details of emerging and ongoing terrorist threats.100 This shift
generated critiques from civil libertarians and lawmakers.10 1 But until
late 2013, critics were largely unable to secure significant victories in
curtailing surveillance powers or even understanding the parameters of
what was authorized under existing law. 102 The tenor of the public debate
became more contentious in June 2013 when Edward Snowden began
revealing classified documents detailing the scope of NSA surveillance on
foreign and U.S. persons in order to prompt public scrutiny and debate
over the programs. Snowden disclosed, among many other things, that
the NSA was engaged in the practice of collecting and retaining the
metadata of all U.S. telephone customers for five years, and had been
running searches through that metadata when there was a "reasonable,
articulable suspicion" that a particular telephone number was associated
with potential terrorist activity.10 3 Further disclosures indicated that
additional surveillance targeted Muslim community leaders in the

(2008) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2015) (authorizing the targeted collection
of data, including content, from overseas targets). When various provisions of the Patriot
Act were up for renewal in 2010, debates on the utility, invasiveness, and potential abuse
of the surveillance provisions ended in congressional reauthorization of the Act without
alternation. See David Kravets, Lawmakers Punt PatriotAct to Obama, WIRED (Feb. 26,
2010, 3:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/2010/02/lawmakers-renew-patriot-act/.

100. See Gil Press, The Effectiveness of Small vs. Big Data Is Where the NSA Debate
Should Start, FORBES (June 12, 2013), http'/www.fDrbes.com/sites/gilpress/201306/12/theeffectiveness-of-small-vs-big-data-is-where-the-nsa-debate-should-start
(discussing
need
to
understand whether a larger or smaller "haystack" of data better enables intelligencegathering and analysis efforts).

101. See, e.g., Felicia Sonmez, Harry Reid, Rand Paul Spar over PatriotAct on Senate
Floor, WASH. POST (May 25, 2011), httpJ/www.washingtonpostcom/blogs/2chambers/post/harryreid-rand-paul-spar-over-patriot-act-on-senate-floor/2011/05/25/AGcgWRBH blog.htni (describing
objections by Senators Rand Paul and Tom Udall to data-gathering provisions being debated
for renewal as part of the Patriot Act).
102. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (holding that plaintiffs
alleging unconstitutional and illegal surveillance lacked standing to bring their complaint
because they had no publicly available proof of their surveillance). Cases that challenge
these surveillance programs on constitutional and statutory grounds are still being
litigated.

103. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013 06.05 PM), httplwww.theguardian.com/world/2013

jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizn-court-order.
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United States who had not engaged in any suspicious activity, other than
the apparent red flag of being Muslim.1 04
The broad scope, lack of particularized suspicion, and lengthy
105
From a
duration of data retention raised substantive concerns.
transparency perspective, concerns arose on two fronts. First, the
purported legitimacy of the program was based on the fact that its
parameters and details had been approved in a nonpublic opinion by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a nonadversarial body that
operates largely in secret and has approved virtually every government
06
Second, the
request for surveillance authority that it has considered.
general structure and details of the program were hidden from most
members of Congress and the public until the Snowden disclosures began.
Together, these concerns raised the question of whether the NSA's
metadata collection program was, in fact, based on secret laws and
without any meaningful understanding of how the government was
interpreting its surveillance authority.
One example of problematic interpretation stems from a Senate
oversight hearing on March 12, 2013, in which Senator Ron Wyden
specifically asked Director of National Intelligence James Clapper if the
NSA was systematically collecting information on the communications of
millions of Americans. 07 Clapper denied this, yet later disclosures
confirmed that the scope of the NSA's data collection included metadata
for telephonic communications, as well as content data for e-mails, texts,
and other such writings.108 After public discussion of the discrepancy, in
104. See Glenn Greenwald & Murtaza Hussain, Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the
FBI and NSA Have Been Spying on, INTERCEPT (July 9, 2014, 12:01 AM), httpsi//theintercep
tcom/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/.
105. The U.S. intelligence community has engaged in numerous programs involving
warrantless surveillance, and this analysis only considers the bulk metadata collection that
was arguably authorized under Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Other warrantless
surveillance-of non-U.S. persons or on non-U.S. territory-falls under the auspices of other
authorities, such as Executive Order 12333 or Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. The structural accountability problems raised here with regard to the
NSA Metadata Program can be extrapolated to consider other domestic surveillance
questions based on common legal and political frameworks.
106. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
107. Glenn Kessler, James Clapper's 'Least Untruthful' Statement to the Senate, WASH.
POST (June 12, 2013), http1/www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/james-clappers-leastuntruthful-statement-to-the-senate/2013/06/11/e5O677a8-d2d8-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_blog.html
Senator Wyden posed the following question: "[D]oes the NSA collect any type of data at all
on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans?" Clapper responded, "No, sir." Id.
108. See Siobhan Gorman & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, New DetailsShow Broader NSA
Surveillance Reach, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2013, 11:31 PM), httpJ/online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887324108204579022874091732470.html (describing how seventy-five percent
of email traffic, including the content of emails, sent or received by United States persons
is captured by various NSA programs).
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his testimony, Clapper noted that he and the NSA used a 1982 Defense
Department regulation to define the word "collect" to mean the point at
which searches through the stored data provide results and those results
are analyzed by a person.10 9 Using this definition, Clapper was able to
argue that "collection" does not occur at the point at which the data is
gathered or even when algorithms are used to sort the data for relevance,
even though a plain reading would suggest otherwise. In fact, common
understanding suggests that "collection" occurred at any number of
points earlier in the NSA's data gathering and sorting process,
particularly since humans were actively querying the database of
information.
Although Wyden and others tasked with oversight theoretically could
have found the 1982 regulatory definition and used it to ask follow up
questions of Clapper, it seems that if Wyden had used a synonym for
"collect" that was not an obscurely defined term of art, such as "gather,"
or "intake and store," Clapper might not have been able to mislead
Congress in his March 2013 testimony. In that sense, Clapper engaged in
constructive secrecy: the legally operative meaning of "collection" was
theoretically not a secret, but the administration did not volunteer the
meaning that it was relying upon and the operative definition was not
made clear to oversight bodies. Until subsequent disclosures helped
clarify the dissonance between the publicly understood parameters of the
NSA's metadata program and the legally operative parameters, the
administration could retain secrecy around its policy while denying that
it was secret at all.
In late 2013 and the years following, the Obama administration
increased its public willingness to improve protections of privacy and civil
liberties and improve transparency when those goals were compatible
with intelligence gathering interests. 110 For example, in early 2016 the
109. See DEP'T OF DEF., PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF DOD INTELLIGENCE
COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT UNITED STATES PERSONS, DoD 5240. 1-R (1982). This regulation

defines "collection" as follows: "Information shall be considered as 'collected' only when it
has been received for use by an employee of a [Department of Defense] intelligence
component in the course of his official duties . . . . Data acquired by electronic means is
'collected' only when it has been processed into intelligible form." Id. § C2.2.1, at 15.
110. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the United States
Military Academy
Commencement
Ceremony
(May 28, 2014,
10:22 AM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-west-pointacademy-commencement-ceremony ("Our intelligence community has done outstanding
work, and we have to continue to protect sources and methods. But when we cannot explain
our efforts clearly and publicly, we face terrorist propaganda and international suspicion,
we erode legitimacy with our partners and our people, and we reduce accountability in our
own government .... [We're putting in place new restrictions on how America collects and
uses intelligence-because we will have fewer partners and be less effective if a perception
takes hold that we're conducting surveillance against ordinary citizens."). In February 2015,
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NSA's Civil Liberties and Privacy Office issued a newly mandated
transparency report.'11 Among other things, this report clarified that
newly imposed limitations on data gathering practices were being
interpreted by the NSA and Congress in the same way, thus alleviating
some concerns that the NSA was engaging in the type of constructive
secrecy that had previously allowed misleading statements, like
Clapper's, to be made to Congress. 112
The primary message from the Obama administration from 2013
onward was that the Snowden disclosures were unnecessary, illegal, and
counterproductive to both intelligence-gathering programs and national
security. 113 Yet, no evidence suggests that any of the accountability
measures championed by the administration and Congress would have
existed or gained significant purchase but for the Snowden disclosures.114
To the contrary, some within the NSA actively attempted to avoid
oversight by the Department of Justice. 115 Other oversight mechanisms,
such as the Office of the Inspector General for the NSA, 116 are well-suited

the Director of National Intelligence announced new limits to the scope of Section 215
surveillance and intelligence-gathering that largely reflected the type of limitations
suggested by President Obama in 2014. See ODNI General Counsel Robert Litt's As
Prepared Remarks on Signals Intelligence Reform at the Brookings Institute (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://icontherecordttumblr.com/post/110632851413/odni-general-counsel-robert-litts-asprepared.
111. NSA CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY OFFICE, TRANSPARENCY REPORT: THE USA
FREEDOM ACT BUSINESS RECORDS FISA IMPLEMENTATION (2016), httpsJ/fas.org/irp/nsa/ufa2016.pdf
112. See id. at 4-7 (including definitions and the applications of the parameters of the
USA Freedom Act).
113. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of Signals
Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014, 11:15 AM), httpJ/www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/re
marks-president-review-signals-intelligence.
114. Snowden provided written testimony to the European Parliament stating that he
had attempted to discuss his concerns with regard to various aspects of NSA surveillance
with superiors within the NSA prior to his public disclosure, but that his efforts were either
ignored or rebuffed. See Edward J. Snowden, Answers to Written Questions from the
EuropeanParliament,EUR. PARL. 1, 5 (March 7, 2014), http1/www.europarLeuropa.euldocume
ntlactivities/cont/20140320140307ATI'80674/20140307AT180674EN.pdf
115. See Barton Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of Times per Year, Audit
Finds, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-auditfinds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-aO7f-49ddc7417125_story.html (explaining how NSA
operatives requesting permission to extend surveillance to a new target were instructed to
limit the information disclosed to Justice Department "overseers").
116. Commentators have suggested that an independently appointed and overseen
Inspector General for the NSA would provide a better avenue for accountability. See Britt
Snider & Charles Battaglia, National Security Agency Needs an Independent Inspector
General, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/national-
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to deal with allegations of statutory and policy compliance violations, but
not with a large-scale systemic and philosophical complaint about privacy
rights such as that of Snowden. 117 Other potential avenues for
accountability, such as the Office of the Inspector General for the Defense
Department, were rendered impotent by the lack of access to the relevant
information.1 18 The extreme secrecy that surrounded these surveillance
programs, even within the Obama administration, suggests that many
existing oversight mechanisms were, in the time before the Snowden
disclosures, not effective and succeeded only in giving a veneer of
accountability over a program that lacked it.
D. ContextualizingPrivate Interpetations
The fact that so many accountability measures were theoretically in
place but easily avoidable until the fallout of the Snowden disclosures
goes to the heart of what concerned the CJEU in Schrems and was part
of the reason that the CJEU came down so hard on the old Safe Harbor
agreement. It was not that Schrems or the CJEU could point to a series
of specific violations of the Safe Harbor agreement that actually undercut
the fundamental privacy rights of an EU citizen. Instead, the CJEU's
decision was founded on the understanding that, as of 2013, the United
States was likely maneuvering around the privacy protections and
oversight mandated in the Safe Harbor agreement by not abiding by
public understandings of those protections and instead relying on its
privately held legal interpretations of its obligations.
In each of the contexts discussed in this Part, the Bush and Obama
administrations secretly reinterpreted and, therefore, subverted
commonly understood, ordinary definitions of terms in order to conduct a
national security related program in a way that arguably violated
security-agency-needs-an-independent-inspector-general/2013/09/26/ae37d7fc-25f4-1 1e3adOd-b7c8d2a594b9 story.html?utmterm=.2d587OdOaadl.
117. See Interviews with NSA officials (various dates, on file with author) (discussing the
fact that the job of the NSA Inspector General would not have been to discuss the
"philosophical differences" that Snowden had with the NSA's programmatic and policy
choices). However, the Inspector General for the NSA has publicly stated that if Snowden
had complained to the Inspector General, his allegations would have been investigated
thoroughly. Darren Samuelsohn, NSA Watchdog Talks Snowden, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2014,
6:37 PM), http://politi.co/NvvjAE. But it seems quite likely that the extent of the Inspector
General's inquiry would have been to examine the program against the existing statutory
authority and find that the bulk data collection was statutorily authorized.
118. See Spencer Ackerman, Pentagon Watchdog Wot Aware' of NSA Bulk Phone Data
Collection, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2014, 3:36 PM), httpJ/www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/1
8/pentagon-watchdog-nsa-bulk-phone-collection (saying that the Defense Department Deputy
Inspector General was unaware of the bulk data collection until learning about it through
the June 2013 Snowden leaks).
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international and/or domestic law. Each administration was somewhat
successful in doing so because the domestic control mechanisms in
place-internal review within the Executive Branch, Congress, Article III
courts, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court-failed to
demand transparency and accountability in how the government was
interpreting and implementing its obligations under various laws and
treaties.
The Privacy Shield emerges in a different context: the control
mechanisms described in the Privacy Shield, such as the ombudsperson,
are domestic. However, because the Privacy Shield is a transnational
agreement, it can be held to account in a more rigorous manner because
it had to be validated by EU regulators, will be reviewed annually by U.S.
and EU regulators, and can be invalidated by courts outside of the United
States. EU regulators do not have to wait for the CJEU to consider
whether the Privacy Shield's protections for the privacy rights of EU
citizens are adequate. In the interim, EU regulators involved in
overseeing the implementation of the Privacy Shield can take an active
role in making sure that the United States is not using its own private
dictionary in interpreting its obligations under the Privacy Shield.
III. POTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS AGAINST CONSTRUCTIVE SECRECY

It is possible that the Trump administration will engage in
constructive secrecy with the Privacy Shield along the lines of what the
Bush and Obama administrations did in the contexts of torture, targeted
killings, and surveillance. As of this writing, it is unclear what kind of
the
Trump
commitments
rights-protective
and
transparency
administration will make and whether it will abide by those
commitments once they are made. If the Trump administration does
engage in interpretation that subverts the Privacy Shield, then the
legally operative interpretation under which the administration acts
would likely be kept secret from the public, even as public assurances
suggest compliance with the constraints that most people, including EU
regulators, believe is part of the agreement.
The Privacy Shield may be particularly vulnerable to this problem for
several reasons. First, the same expansive carve-out regarding national
security that existed in the Safe Harbor agreement is also included in the
Privacy Shield.11 9 Second, the 2016 commitments by the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence include a description of the six types of
data collection that the United States will be entitled to collect in the
name of national security under the Privacy Shield: detecting and

119. See Privacy Shield, supranote 7, § 1.5.
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countering certain activities of foreign powers, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, cybersecurity, detecting and countering threats to the
United States or allied armed forces, and combatting transnational
criminal threat, including sanctions evasion. 120 Based on current U.S.
definitions of terrorism and security, 1 2 1 these categories are broad enough
to encompass tremendous swaths of data in a manner that may violate
EU privacy rights. 122 Third, the agency letters affirming that the U.S.
interpretation of the parameters of the Privacy Shield adheres to the
privacy-oriented
aspirations of the framework are not legal
commitments; they are simply a statement of how an agency plans to
act.

12 3

As discussed in Part II, reliance on the good faith interpretations of
the U.S. government regarding national security matters sometimes
resulted in dissonance between the operative legal definition and the
public commitment made by the Bush and Obama administrations.
Under the Trump administration, it is wholly unclear what those public
commitments would be or whether they would be interpreted consistently
for internal purposes. If such interpretive dissonance were to occur, the
privacy rights that the CJEU looked to preserve in Schrems could be
violated regardless of the external commitments that the United States
has made in the Privacy Shield or accompanying letters.
These interpretative concerns, among others, motivated the
September 2016 suit filed by the privacy activist group, Digital Rights
Ireland, seeking annulment of the Privacy Shield by the CJEU.124 In its
complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the Privacy Shield does not comport
120. See Letter from Robert S. Litt, supra note 33, at 4.
121. See generally Sudha Setty, What's in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten
Years After 9/11, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2011) (addressing the extreme broad definitions of
terrorism in the United States and elsewhere).
122. See Eur. Comm'n Press Release, Article 29 Working Party Statement on the Decision
of the European Commission on the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (July 26, 2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/pressrelease/art29_press material/2016/20160726_wp29 wp statementeuus-privacy-shield
en.pdf (expressing concerns that the Privacy Shield would technically allow for mass
collection of signals intelligence, as was authorized when the Safe Harbor was in effect)
[hereinafter Article 29 Working Party Statement]; Katie Bo Williams, US, EU Face
Blowback on DataDeal, HILL (Feb. 29, 2016, 8:06 PM), httpJ/thehillomm/policy/cybersecurity/2
71233-us-eu-face-blowback-on-data-deal (discussing concerns that the Privacy Shield likely
would not withstand scrutiny by the CJEU).
123. See Peter Teffer, EU and US Agree Data 'PrivacyShield', EUOBSERvER (Feb. 2, 2016,
7:21 PM), https://euobserver.comljustice/132109 (quoting Sophie in 't Veld, a Liberal
Member of the European Parliament, as expressing concern that "[t]he assurances seem to
rely exclusively on political commitment, instead of legal acts. So any change in the political
constellation in the US may undo the whole thing").
124. See Complaint, Case T-670/16, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Comm'n, 2016 O.J. (C
410) 26 (filed Sept. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Digital Rights Complaint].
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with the requirements of Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive,
which allows for commercial data transfers so long as there is "an
adequate level of protection . .. by reason of its domestic law or of the
international commitments it has entered into ... for the protection of
the private lives and basic freedoms and rights of individuals." 125 The
plaintiff argues that U.S. domestic law does not adequately protect the
privacy rights of Europeans and that the Privacy Shield does not rise to
the level of an "international commitment" such that the standard
articulated in Article 25 would be satisfied.126
Absent another Snowden-like leak, litigation as in Schrems, or the
CJEU getting involved again as requested in the new Digital Rights
Ireland case, the EU regulators tasked with reviewing the Privacy Shield
should consider how to constrain the U.S. executive branch from relying
on secret interpretations that undermine the objective meaning of the
agreement. One viable option would be to use the annual review in 2017
to formalize the norms and methodology used to interpret the Privacy
Shield, bringing it to the level of an "international commitment" under
the standard of Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive, instead of
simply trusting the U.S. government to interpret the limitations of the
Privacy Shield in a manner that comports with EU privacy standards.
Interpretive norms coming out of international law, international
guidance, and other transnational commitments offer useful guidance.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 127 offers a
straightforward
framework for interpreting treaty
language,
emphasizing in Article 31 that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." 128 Article
31 also affirms that interpretation of a treaty should take into account its
context, purpose, supplemental documentation, subsequent agreements
regarding interpretation, subsequent practices regarding interpretation,
and any relevant rules of applicable international law.1 29 In Article 32,

125. See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 13, art. 25(6).
126. See Digital Rights Complaint, supranote 124, at 27 ("Third plea in law, alleging that
the 'privacy principles' and/or the official (US) 'representations and commitments' . . . do not
constitute 'international commitments' within the meaning of Article 25(6) of Directive
95/46.").
127. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter "Vienna Convention"].
128. Id. art. 31.
129. See id.
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the Vienna Convention goes further to offer additional guidance on means
of interpretation, noting that:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of
article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31 . . . leaves the

meaning ambiguous or obscure; or ...
leads to a result
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 130
Together, the language in these two Articles would go some distance
in constraining the executive branch from creating secret and legally
operative definitions that vary significantly from public commitments
based on national security related concerns. If added to the language of
the Privacy Shield, they may even serve to signal to the CJEU and other
constituencies that the United States is heightening its commitment to
the protections guaranteed under the Privacy Shield, and that those
commitments are not subject to the changing whims of an agency,
administration, or the intelligence community.
The commitments of Articles 31 and 32 cannot simply be inferred;
indeed, they would need to be adopted explicitly in the annual review of
the Privacy Shield, or through another amendment mechanism. The
Vienna Convention is not legally binding on the parties to the Privacy
Shield for a number of reasons. First, the Privacy Shield is not a treaty,
but is a framework applying to private and government actors in two
jurisdictions (the United States and the European Union) that are subject
to regulatory and judicial scrutiny. 131 Second, the United States is a
signatory to the Vienna Convention but has not ratified it, although the
U.S. State Department has noted that it accepts many provisions of the
Vienna Conventions as constituting customary international law on the

130. Id. art. 32.
131. See U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK FAQs
(2016), https1/www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/fides/2016/faqs-eu-us-privacysh
ield_7-16_sccmts.pdf (clarifying the nature of the Privacy Shield as a "framework" as opposed
to "treaty" or other legal instrument).
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law of treaties.1 32 Third, the Vienna Convention has a relatively narrow
scope and only applies to treaties between states. 3 3
Yet the interpretive standards in the Vienna Convention could
provide an important touchstone to help formalize and make uniform the
type of interpretation that the parties to the Privacy Shield purport to
want.1 34 In statements by U.S. and EU negotiators during the
development of the Privacy Shield, as well as in the letters provided by
U.S. regulators when the Privacy Shield was made public, the United
States promised to act in good faith to uphold privacy standards that
would pass the scrutiny of the CJEU. If that is truly the case, then
explicitly tying those commitments to the Vienna Convention's
interpretive standard should be uncontroversial.
Explicit incorporation of the interpretive standards of the Vienna
Convention would be particularly apt because the same standards
articulated in the Vienna Convention have long been considered useful
and necessary in a number of public international and transnational
contexts, private transnational contexts, the canons of U.S. statutory
interpretation, and the laws and guidance surrounding U.S. contract
interpretation. The International Law Commission has looked to the
Vienna Convention in considering how to manage the expansion and
fragmentation of international law,1 35 and the American Law Institute
has articulated similar interpretive standards for international
agreements.1 36 Other agreements, like the widely used and relied on
Covenant for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),1s7 are often
interpreted using analogous principles that rely upon ordinary and
132. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/1I/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
133. See Vienna Convention, supra note 127, art. 1 ('The present Convention applies to
treaties between States.").
134. See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 207-17 (3d ed. 2013)

(explaining the utility of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention).
135. E.g., Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentationof InternationalLaw: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682
(2006). Like the Vienna Convention, the Fragmentation Report notes that treaties are not
to be applied and interpreted in a vacuum. Id. 11 120. The Report notes that "all international
law exists in a systemic relationship with other law" and, therefore, no treaty application
can occur without placing the relevant instrument in its contextual environment, which
suggests that ordinary meanings within the negotiated context must apply when
interpreting the obligations under an agreement. Id. 11 423.
136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325(1)
(AM. LAw INST. 1987) ("An international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.").
137. U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official Records:
Documents of the Conference and Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the
Meetings of the Main Committees, at 178-90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 97/19 (Apr. 11, 1980).
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common understandings of terms. 1as Such an interpretive methodology is
also common in U.S. domestic contract law139 and judicial interpretation
of statutes.140 Therefore, using the interpretive standards articulated in
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention should not only be
uncontroversial as a matter of transnational norm creation, but also as a
matter of substance because the norm in domestic law is to give ordinary
meanings to words in contracts and statutes.
This is not to suggest that such explicit incorporation of interpretive
norms would resolve all of the current concerns involving the Privacy
Shield. Indeed, the complaint in the new Digital Rights Ireland case
alleges many substantive and procedural failures in the Privacy Shield,
many of which echo the concerns voiced by the Article 29 Working Party
of data protection commissioners in EU member states reviewing the
Privacy Shield. 141 Yet, dealing with the problem of potential interpretive
dissonance in a manner that follows international, transnational, and
domestic precedent provides a simple path to improving the Privacy
Shield and, perhaps, resolving one of the issues that privacy rights groups
and the CJEU have justifiably raised in the past.

CONCLUSION

One of the key problems of constructive secrecy is the creation of
public commitments that appear to adequately hold the U.S. government
to account, but the reality is that those commitments present only a

138. See, e.g., Frank Diedrich, MaintainingUniformity in InternationalUniform Law via
Autonomous Interpretation:Software Contracts and the CISG, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV. 303,
317-18 (1996) (noting that the Vienna Convention's interpretive methodology and reliance
on common and ordinary meanings of terms is used to resolve disputes in textual meaning).
139. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("[Ain
interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all terms is
preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no
effect. . . ."); U.C.C. § 1-303 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2001) ("['The express
terms of an agreement and any applicable course of performance, course of dealing, or usage
of trade must be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other.").
140. See Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("[Cjanons of
construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of
legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal
canon before all others .... [Clourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what
it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are
unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete."') (citations
omitted); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 471 (1917) (establishing the plain
meaning rule of statutory construction).
141. See Article 29 Working Party Statement, supra note 122.
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facade of accountability because the legally operative, private
commitments made by the government are substantially different. These
legal "grey holes" provide a dangerous false comfort regarding
government accountability, transparency, and the maintenance of the
rule of law. 142 Time and again in the last fifteen years, the U.S.
government has invoked national security concerns to provide such false
comfort in reassuring the public that it is upholding its domestic and
international legal commitments, only for subsequent disclosures to
make clear that those reassurances were either definitely or arguably illfounded. The concerns expressed by the CJEU in Schrems reflect its
discomfort with the U.S. reliance on constructive secrecy and the false
sense of comfort it provides. The Privacy Shield attempts to remedy that
situation by increasing oversight of U.S. companies conducting
transnational data transfers and by seeking overt commitments from
U.S. government agencies that the privacy protections for EU citizens
will rise to a level that would likely survive subsequent scrutiny by the
CJEU.
Perhaps the CJEU will uphold the Privacy Shield as satisfying the
Data Protection Directive, but the September 2016 suit brought by
Digital Rights Ireland highlights the doubts as to whether the language
in the Privacy Shield adequately constrains the U.S. government.
Further, the CJEU continues to make it clear in its jurisprudence that it
will enforce the privacy rights of EU citizens even in the face of strong
arguments about the need for potentially intrusive data collection in the
name of national security.143
The CJEU may also be skeptical of the efficacy of the Privacy Shield
based on a lack of transparency and concerns as to how the Trump
administration will interpret its privacy commitments under the
agreement. A January 25, 2017 Executive Order requires federal
agencies to limit privacy protections for non-U.S. citizens, 1" an action
that immediately led European lawmakers to express uncertainty
regarding the U.S. commitment to the Privacy Shield. 145 Other comments
142. See David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside
the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005, 2026 (2006).
143. See Tele2, supra note 12, 1|1 72-73 (reasoning that invocations of national security
did not justify the type of bulk data collection at issue in the case).
144. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the
Interior of the United States (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/01/25/presidential-executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united
("Agencies shall, to the extent consistent with applicable law, ensure that their privacy
policies exclude persons who are not United States citizens or lawful permanent residents
from the protections of the Privacy Act regarding personally identifiable information.").
145. E.g., Jeff John Roberts, U.S. Tech Industry Wants Trump to Calm EU Data Fears,
FORTUNE (Feb. 2, 2017) http://fortune.com/2017/02/02/trump-privacy-shield/ (describing
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made by members of the Trump administration calling for a reduction of
privacy protections in the name of national security have further
increased skepticism as to whether the Privacy Shield will be enforced as
written. 146 In fact, in early April 2017, the European Parliament passed
a resolution asking the European Commission to undertake its upcoming
2017 review of the Privacy Shield with an eye toward better
understanding how the United States has thus far interpreted its
obligations under the agreement.1 47
None of these developments will reassure the CJEU that the Privacy
Shield is an adequate framework to protect the privacy rights of EU
citizens. The precarity of the Privacy Shield undermines confidence in
both the enforcement of fundamental privacy protections and the viability
of businesses that depend on data transfers. This makes it all the more
important for the United States to make the interpretative methodology
of the Privacy Shield a matter of public record, an international
commitment, and a subject of external accountability. Doing so would not
ameliorate all of the concerns surrounding the Privacy Shield, but it
would strengthen the U.S. government's argument that it ought to be
trusted in this context.

concerns of a former Federal Trade Commissioner that the executive order could make
European lawmakers skittish about the U.S. application of the Privacy Shield); Natasha
Lomas, Trump OrderStrips PrivacyRights from Non-U.S. Citizens, Could Nix EU-US Data
Flows, TECH CRUCNH (Jan. 26, 2017), httpsJ/techcrunchmm/2017/01/26/trump-order-stripsprivacy-rights-from-non-u-s-citizens-could-nix-eu-us-data-flows/ (noting concerns of a Member of
the European Parliament as to the uncertain enforcement of the Privacy Shield in light of
the executive order).
146. See Melanie Teplinsky, Opinion: Will Trump Sink Privacy Shield?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Feb. 24, 2017), http1/www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2017/0224/
Opinion-Will-Trump-sink-Privacy-Shield.
147. See Catherine Stupp, MEPs Want Commission to Toughen up Privacy Shield Under
Trump, EURACTIV (Apr. 7, 2017), http-/www.euractiv.com/section/data-protection/news/mepswant-commission-to-toughen-up-privacy-shield-under-trump/.

